Monitoring of the information space

The issue of desertion from military units remains one of the most pressing in Ukrainian society and is perhaps the subject most prone to information manipulation. However, during the reporting period, the overall volume of discussion on this topic has decreased significantly.

Among the narratives promoted by Moscow, the following stand out: desertion is a necessary step due to the ‘busification’ (conscription) of people on the streets and their subsequent ‘disposal’ at the front by ‘brainless’ commanders. Thus, desertion is a ‘legitimate protest’ against such treatment.

At the same time, foreign mercenaries were referred to as “mercenary marauders”, and, as such, were unable to resolve the issues. In this way, the idea of Ukraine’s Minister of Defence Mykhailo Fedorov regarding the recruitment of foreign citizens into the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is criticised. And the proposed changes to Ukrainian legislation regarding increased liability for committing military service evasion are framed as turning Ukraine into a “digital concentration camp” and tantamount to the introduction of “slavery”. It is important to note that the very term “concentration camp” in relation to Ukraine is being promoted by the Russians far from for the first time and has a long history of use.

The issue of AWOL is being actively promoted in the Ukrainian information space. Conflict situations involving individuals subject to forced military service are, through information distortions, presented as the “logical result of forced mobilisation”, which allows responsibility to be shifted from these individuals onto the state. A striking example of disinformation and manipulation is the Facebook account of the pro-Russian politician and former MP from the Opposition Platform – For Life party, Yevhen Murayev (subject to NSDCU sanctions), which contained direct incitement to commit war crimes.

A specific target of Russian disinformation is mobilisation and return from the private military companies (PMCs), which is portrayed as a “one-way ticket”, whilst desertion is presented as “self-defence” and “escape from a punitive system”. Cases of voluntary return from AWOL and finding oneself anew in the military require wider coverage to counter destructive enemy narratives.

Overall, the topic of the AWOL is gradually becoming a source of systematic background pressure on the audience of Ukrainian social media. Although video platforms such as YouTube and TikTok generate fewer mentions, they generate disproportionately more user engagement than Facebook and Telegram. USCC analysts have noted signs of coordinated cognitive attacks aimed at desacralising institutions and undermining the social contract. The lack of rotations at the front, coupled with a section of Ukrainian society tolerating evasion of military service, is leading to increased antagonism between those who carry the burden of war and those trying with all their might to ‘get out of it’. This poses risks to social cohesion.

The dynamics indicate that discussion of the topic of basic military training is driven by news and information triggers, without any consistent positive or negative trend. The main theme during the reporting period was the reform of training and the adaptation of new recruits to their new status and environment. An increasing number of units are showcasing in their media materials the path taken by service members through basic training – both physical and psychological.

Recruitment also has a predominantly neutral coverage and has even shown significant growth – by a full 47 points, reaching +47 compared to the previous one-and-a-half-month period. This indicates a shift in the narrative towards positive coverage of the topic. The focus remains on the personalisation of the army and the conscious choice of where to serve. Recruitment remains the only stable driver of positivity, which contrasts sharply with other topics.

One of the most powerful examples of recruitment in the media was an interview with the commander of the 3rd Army Corps (3 AC), Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi, which garnered 1.22 million views. Oleh Chornyi from the Hart brigade spoke on the national marathon broadcast about the Ukrainian army’s urgent need for IT specialists to operate drones, electronic warfare systems and engineering projects. This point was echoed by Ruslana Bohdan, head of communications for the 57th Separate Motorised Infantry Brigade, who spoke on air about vacancies for navigators, aviation and technical specialists, even those without initial combat experience.

The issue of mobilisation and the work of the Territorial Defence Forces remains the most contentious, characterised by a consistently negative tone and high levels of emotion. The main arguments centred on the artificial pitting of civilians, Ukrainian Defence Forces fighters and TCRSS servicemembers against one another, and the demonisation of the latter (“thugs”, “bandits”, “totally corrupt”).

The core of the narrative continues to be situations of “forced mobilisation”. This is also fuelled by the media and social networks, where such incidents are presented as systematic practice. Although in reality, these may be isolated cases. Conversely, examples of positive communication between citizens and representatives of the TCRSS in the media and on social networks receive predominantly negative reactions and even harassment. Due to mass commenting and sharing (likely involving bot farms), such videos gain popularity and go viral. It is in the comments that one can read direct calls for organised resistance to mobilisation and against the state authorities.

Fake information about deaths “at the hands of the TCRSS” was circulated online, which turned out to be false. In particular, there were reports of the death of a 15-year-old girl in the Ternopil region, which bore all the hallmarks of a disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting state institutions. Similarly, claims that “2 out of 10 Ukrainians” die following such clashes is a fake too. This fake was created by the Russians, who doctored an ISW video. A false report also circulated about the “death of a 72-year-old pensioner” in the Vinnytsia region due to “suspicion of aiding draft dodgers”. The existence of official denials in both cases did not prevent their widespread circulation.

Meanwhile, the Russian intelligence network is seeking operatives to commit crimes against representatives of the TCRSS. At the same time, there is a growing trend of obstructing mobilisation efforts and a sense of moral justification for attacks on the TCRSS. This may be seen as signs of hostile information and psychological operations (IPSO), as information directly influences cognitive attitudes.

On the other hand, only 8% of Ukrainian citizens (according to a KIIS (Kyiv International Institute Of Sociology) poll) consider mobilisation to be one of the main challenges facing Ukraine, which may indicate that the issue is being artificially amplified in the country’s information space. However, the situation is so charged that any public support for the process of replenishing the army can result in online harassment. The topic of mobilisation and the TCRSS also remains a means of scoring political points, both for politicians from the pro-government camp and those from the opposition. This creates additional threats to national security, as so-called “independent” bloggers often join in the criticism, amplifying hostile narratives.

A positive narrative on mobilisation is also present, but less widespread and loses out to the negative narrative in terms of reach and engagement. It is largely linked to new initiatives by the Ministry of Defence regarding further digitalisation and the recruitment of foreigners, as well as the publicity following the adoption of the law on a one-year deferment for military personnel under the “Contract 18-24” scheme after one year of service.