Support
Support

Strategic objectives of information influence

Ukraine has been the target of Russian information pressure for many years. After 2014, these campaigns became systematic, and after 2022, they became part of an overarching strategy of war.

Today, the target is not only the government or the army, but the entire societal resilience of the state.

Three strategic objectives of Russian information campaigns:
1. Discrediting 2. Undermining trust 3. Destruction of unity

Discrediting mobilisation and legitimising draft evasion.

Undermining trust in the state and the army as institutions. The result is a frame in which the state is perceived not as an object of protection, but as a source of threat.

Destroying societal unity through the escalation of internal conflicts.

Evolution of Information Operation Objectives: A Shift in Focus

The objectives of Russia’s information operations have shifted: until 2023, the main focus was on external influence; from 2024, the emphasis has shifted to undermining Ukraine’s internal resilience, whilst external narratives have receded into the background, though they have not disappeared.

Up to 2023: external influence 2023–2026: internal resilience

Weakening Ukraine’s armed resistance

Undermining the state’s mobilisation capacity

Building the image of a «failed state»

Changing social norms regarding military duty

Undermining international support for Ukraine

Cultivating a «culture of draft evasion»

Disinformation (hoaxes) targeting Ukrainian refugees in European countries

Manipulation based on real problems

Manipulative narratives about alleged Western fatigue with Ukraine

Intensifying societal polarisation and undermining internal unity
russia’s shift in priorities:

having failed to achieve its military objectives, Moscow transferred its strike from the battlefield to the factors of long-term resilience: human resources, societal morale and trust in institutions. The target of Russian information attacks: social norms.

russia’s information aggression:

a systematic attempt to legitimise draft evasion, destroy the societal consensus on defence, and polarise Ukrainian society through despair.

Monitoring of the Information Environment

The research covered three key thematic areas:

recruitment to the Defence Forces of Ukraine, AWOL, BMT;

mobilisation and TCRSS activities;

the topic of societal unity.

The Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre (USCC) monitors and analyses the information environment, focusing on the primary targets of Russian influence.

The monitoring covers the Ukrainian information environment, including Facebook, Telegram, Instagram, X (Twitter), YouTube, TikTok, as well as Ukrainian media and information resources.

Content language (mentions) – Ukrainian and Russian. Geography: Ukraine and European countries. The assessment of information environment dynamics is carried out using AI tools and the Net Sentiment Rate (NSR).

Research period: 1 November 2025 – 1 May 2026.

During the monitoring period, the USCC identified over 9.6 million mentions — news items, posts, comments, reposts and video content — from 2.5 million authors using the keywords of the topics under study.

mentions
9,6M
the author
2,5M

Topic: “Recruitment to the Defence Forces”

Keywords: “Recruitment into the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, “Absent Without Official Leave”, “basic military training”;

  • Over 701,000 mentions monitored from approximately 227,000 authors.
  • The topic’s sentiment score (NSR) was –56.
mentions
701k
the authors
227k
NSR: -56 units
-100 0

Topic: “Mobilisation”

Keywords: “mobilisation”, “Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres”, “draft dodger”;

  • Over 7.8 million mentions monitored from approximately 2 million authors.
  • The topic’s sentiment score (NSR) was –89.
mentions
7,8M
the authors
2M
NSR: -89 units
-100 0
The Net Sentiment Rate (AI-based) is an index that measures the balance of positive and negative reactions on a scale from -100 to +100, where 0 is a neutral value.

Topic: “Societal Unity”

Keywords: “betrayal”, “unity”, “social division”;

  • Over 1 million mentions monitored from approximately 327,000 authors.
  • The topic’s sentiment score (NSR) was –92.

Monitoring since November 2025 records a persistently negative dynamic in the Ukrainian information space: critical and manipulative narratives systematically dominate over constructive messages.

mentions
1M
the authors
327k
NSR: -92 units
-100 0

The space is characterised by:

A high level of polarisation and the constant reproduction of conflict-driven topics.

The rapid scaling of provocative content through platform algorithms.

A vacuum of proactive state communication, which is promptly filled by hostile narratives.

The Net Sentiment Rate (AI-based) sentiment indicator ranged from -56 to -92.

The enemy systematically attempts to frame mobilisation, recruitment and basic military training through the lens of violence, injustice and coercion.

Russia’s information viruses:

  • “Rational evasion”: framing refusal to serve as a ”logical personal choice”.
  • Delegitimisation of resistance: promoting the thesis of the “futility of struggle” and the “price of survival”.
  • Glorification of desertion: an attempt to make fleeing socially acceptable or ”morally justified”.
  • Devaluation of the state: the assertion that “the state is not worth defending”.
NSR: -92 units -56 units
-100 General tone by topic 0

Scale of identified activity: November 2025 – May 2026

  • Approximately 200 channels and accounts submitted for blocking (Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram) — in cooperation with the Centre for Countering Disinformation, the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
  • Networks of synthetic “military” accounts coordinated with statements from Russian command were identified.
  • Networks recruiting citizens via Telegram for participation in provocations and acts of sabotage were documented.
200
channels and accounts
Submitted for blocking

Examples of disinformation:

The “Diary of a Draft Dodger”

The “Diary of a Draft Dodger” network, identified across various platforms, distributes AI-generated anti-mobilisation content. Specifically: a Facebook page (92,000 subscribers) and a YouTube channel (3,300 subscribers; 1.6 million views). Systematic content with calls for AWOL and demoralising narratives, including: “this country is no longer ours”, “there is no point in defending it”, “go AWOL — save your life”.

The “Diary of a Draft Dodger”
Facebook

The page “Dumky z nulya” (“Thoughts from Zero (Frontline)”) on Facebook (13,000 subscribers; over 10 million views) systematically disseminated manipulative anti-mobilisation and anti-government AI-generated video content purportedly featuring Ukrainian servicemembers. The page has since been blocked.

Facebook
TikTok

The Telegram channel “news_worldd” (7,800 subscribers; approximately 10 million views) disseminated AI-generated disinformation content. Specifically, a fabricated video depicting an alleged anti-mobilisation protest on Khreshchatyk was recorded. The channel has since been blocked.

TikTok
Telegram

On Telegram, Russian information actors disseminated fabricated video content about the alleged “chipping of mobilised persons like dogs” in Ukraine, styled to resemble a Kyiv 24 broadcast. The material gained significant reach: at least 250 publications were recorded with a combined reach of approximately 1.6 million views. The content was also disseminated on VKontakte, in online media and through a network of pro-Kremlin bloggers and propagandists, including Vladimir Solovyov, Ostashko and Yulia Latynina.

Telegram

Mechanics of Influence: From Fabrications to Normalisation

AI doesn’t just automate disinformation — it makes it qualitatively more believable and effective.

Identified networks of AI-generated “military” accounts
  • Emotionally compelling calls to abandon positions;
  • Exaggeration of Russian successes at the front;
  • Synchronisation with statements from Russian command;
  • Use for Russia’s domestic propaganda (“Ukrainians do not want to fight”);

Consequence: the content is difficult to identify as synthetic, complicates moderation and demoralises servicemembers and potential recruits

The growing role of AI in disinformation

The dynamics of normalisation — a shift in social norms The objective of information campaigns goes beyond discrediting individual institutions. It concerns the reformatting of the basic societal consensus: the transformation of draft evasion from a socially condemned into a ”rationally justified” or even “morally grounded” behaviour.
At the same time, a narrative is being shaped in which any stance in support of the state’s actions is automatically labelled as ”dictatorship” or ”repression”, thereby making constructive public discourse impossible.

Criticism of the system: emphasis on corruption, the unfairness of mobilisation procedures, the ineffectiveness of state institutions.

Criticism of the system: emphasis on corruption, the unfairness of mobilisation procedures, the ineffectiveness of state institutions.

Criticism of the system: emphasis on corruption, the unfairness of mobilisation procedures, the ineffectiveness of state institutions.

Criticism of the system: emphasis on corruption, the unfairness of mobilisation procedures, the ineffectiveness of state institutions.

Unlike the practices of 2022, contemporary information operations rarely rely on outright falsehoods.
The key mechanism is the hyperbolic amplification of real problems: actual social tension, a sensitive incident or legitimate criticism is systematically amplified and scaled through distribution networks.
This makes counter-efforts significantly more difficult — a fabrication can be refuted, but manipulation based on a real fact is far harder to disprove.
The key mechanism remains the “grain of truth” principle: when a real social problem, incident or sensitive topic is emotionally hyperbolised and scaled through social media and bot networks.

Shift in perceptions regarding mobilisation:

November 2025 – January 2026
  • Formation of core negative narratives surrounding mobilisation
  • Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres (TCRSS) increasingly perceived negatively
  • Narratives of injustice and corruption dominate public discourse
  • No large-scale escalation observed
  • Civilian resistance remained largely limited to verbal confrontations
November 2025 – January 2026
  • Institutionalisation of negative perceptions of mobilisation
  • Dehumanisation of TCRSS personnel
  • Shift from verbal confrontation to physical violence
  • Increase in attacks and fatal incidents involving TCRSS personnel
  • Attempts to promote and normalise the glorification of unlawful behaviour by citizens evading mobilisation

Positive Trends

Our sociological research demonstrates the gradual adaptation of Ukrainian society to the conditions of a prolonged information war and a growing level of information resilience.

While personal networks previously remained the primary reference point for many, trust in international media and official state sources is now increasing.

Certain shifts are also evident in Ukrainians’ attitudes towards effective methods of countering disinformation.

Shifts in priorities regarding effective methods of countering disinformation (where 1 = completely ineffective, 5 = very effective)

Wave 1 sociological survey:
  • 3,77 rapid official rebuttal of false information;
  • 3,70 active public education about the methods and objectives of Russian propaganda;
  • 3,69 blocking pro-Russian platforms.
Wave 2 sociological survey:
  • 3,81 active public education about the methods and objectives of Russian propaganda;
  • 3,79 rapid official rebuttal of false information;
  • 3,56 blocking pro-Russian platforms.
The model of audience behaviour when encountering questionable content has also changed. People more frequently turn to verification of information through other Ukrainian or official sources and exercise greater caution when engaging with potentially manipulative content.
This is an important indicator of growing media literacy and awareness that contemporary disinformation operates not only through individual fabrications, but through a complex influence on emotions, trust and societal sentiment.
Wave 1 sociological survey:
  • 58% verification of information through Ukrainian sources;
  • 41% verification through international sources.
Wave 2 sociological survey:
  • 68% verification of information through other Ukrainian sources, including official ones;
  • 28% verification through international sources.

Key conclusion

Increasingly, it is not individual policies or decisions that are under pressure, but the overall resilience of society: readiness to resist, trust in state institutions, internal unity, and the legitimacy of the duty to defend the state.
The objective is to reduce society’s capacity to function as a unified political and defence system.
The absence of positive and proactive communication from the state is being filled by Russian disinformation narratives.
Active monitoring of disinformation and explaining to society the mechanics and objectives of information influence have a positive effect on societal information hygiene.

Strategic relevance for democracies

The model of information operations documented in Ukraine is not unique. It is a replicable technology already being deployed against other democratic societies.
Not to defeat truth — but to destroy trust.
Not to win arguments — but to render reasoned discourse impossible.
Key elements of the identified model have already been reproduced in campaigns against other democracies: polarisation around security and migration issues, discrediting of electoral institutions, and synthetic content on social media. For Ukraine’s partner countries, this case constitutes a strategic warning, not merely an example from a “someone else’s” war.

Recommendations for government policy

For Ukrainian authorities

Strategic communications:
  • Transition from reactive rebuttal of fabrications to proactive shaping of the information agenda, staying ahead of hostile campaigns.
  • Combining controlled openness regarding the mobilisation process (within the bounds of public information), rapid response to information spikes and systematic explanation of how institutions function.
  • Institutionalise open communication on problematic topics as a trust-restoration tool, rather than avoiding them.
Institutional response:
  • Develop a mechanism for the rapid response to identified campaigns — with clearly designated responsible parties and timeframes.
  • Systematically restrict the operation of disinformation networks: coordination between the National Security and Defence Council, TCRSS, the Security Service of Ukraine and digital platforms.
  • Include information resilience in the list of combat readiness indicators, on a par with quantitative mobilisation parameters.
Recommendations for government policy
For international partners

A promising avenue is the development of shared standards for identifying AI-generated content between states and digital platforms, as well as agreed mechanisms for its labelling.

Deepening systematic data-sharing on information operations between Ukraine and international partners.

Supporting the development of technologies for detecting synthetic content as an element of protecting democratic institutions.

A separate area of focus could be the development of information resilience indicators as an analytical tool for assessing the effectiveness of counter-disinformation efforts.

The common denominator: resilience as a strategic resource

Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that in contemporary conflict, information resilience is not an auxiliary element but a key component of the defence system.

Investment in media literacy, institutional transparency and technological tools for detecting manipulation is not expenditure on “soft security”. It is an investment in defence capability.

Societal trust in the state, internal unity and the capacity for action are strategic assets comparable to military and economic resources. Their erosion is an independent objective of the adversary.

The common denominator: resilience as a strategic resource
Together, we can do more — support our project

Join us with a donation in a way that is convenient for you and help make our work more effective and impactful. To everyone who contributes — endless thanks and hugs.

Learn more about our activities...
Support

Contact for media:

[email protected]
UA EN
[email protected]
+38(095) 745-76-17
Support