A team of analysts of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre monitored the information space from 15 December 2025 to 1 February 2026. Over this one-and-a-half-month period, the analysts identified 2.2 million mentions of the topics “recruitment to the Defence Forces”, “mobilisation and TCRSS” and “unity” from 923,000 authors. The enemy’s active efforts to disrupt mobilisation processes in Ukraine were noted, as well as the dehumanisation of TCRSS activities, which puts them at risk during notification procedures, and the destabilisation of the socio-political situation in the country, in particular through the discrediting of the country’s leadership, state institutions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. There is a need for better communication regarding the successes of the Ukrainian Defence Forces, recruitment and career opportunities in the army.
Recruitment to the UAF, AWOL and BMT
211,000 mentions from 96,000 authors – posts, comments, shares and reposts. The main platforms for dissemination are Facebook (56% reach) and Telegram (21%). The issue of desertion and evading military service remains one of the main “weak spots” that the enemy exploits.
During the reporting period, the topic of desertion remained dominant. At least 162,000 posts on this topic were published by 78,000 authors, with a predominantly negative tone (-71 on the AI-based NSR system, where -100 is the absolute minimum).
One of the main narratives of Russian propaganda is the portrayal of desertion as the only way to survive the war, to support loved ones during a “humanitarian crisis”, “to act rationally” and even to avoid punishment (crossing the border, using the legal services of “lawyers” to avoid criminal liability). The aggressor’s propaganda also actively “hypes up” certain statements heard in Ukrainian media (for example, the quote “many Ukrainians choose prison over mobilisation”, which was taken out of context from an interview with military ombudswoman Olga Reshetilova). Another claim is that “only some fanatics are fighting, whilst ordinary people see no point in continuing to fight for this country”.
At the same time, Russian propaganda continues to create blatant fakes around the topic of the AWOL to put pressure on serving military personnel and demoralise them. In particular, regarding the alleged “chipping of conscripts like dogs” (250 posts with 1.6 million views). The content is often created using artificial intelligence in the form of short, attention-grabbing videos for social media and is aimed at eliciting an emotional response and motivating people to join the AWOL to “save lives” (one such page has 1.4 million views with just 13,000 followers).
In contrast to sharply negative posts about the Armed Forces, the TCRSS and mobilisation, the topic of voluntary recruitment into the army had the most positive tone throughout the entire monitoring period, albeit with significantly lower reach (6,400 mentions from 2,700 authors). This is primarily due to increasingly active communication from both serving military personnel and “yesterday’s civilians” who have decided to join the army. Posts about voluntary mobilisation by writer and volunteer Andrii Liubka and presenter Vadym Karpiak attracted a great deal of attention.
In these, they described the process from submitting an application to the start of basic military training and its conditions (both emphasised the quality of the process and the good provision of facilities). Other military personnel appearing on the “United News” telethon also stressed that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not looking for mere “conscripts”, but for specialists whose experience and civilian skills can be applied in service. In return, units offer opportunities for choice, transfer and career development, as well as respect and attention from commanders. We need to develop such stories, share more about successful recruitment examples, and emphasise the Ukrainian Defence Forces’ need for personnel not only for combat roles but also for logistical positions, where civilians can apply their skills and abilities. Present military service through the stories of people who are currently serving or are just preparing to do so. Engaging public opinion leaders in the military counteracts the narratives of Russian propaganda that only “ordinary Ukrainians” are fighting there.
Mobilisation and the TCRSS
1.6 million mentions from 695,000 authors – posts, comments, shares and reposts. The main platforms for dissemination are Facebook (54% reach) and Telegram (25%).
Throughout the reporting period, Ukraine’s information space remained a hotspot for Russian PSYOPs, aimed at portraying the work of the TCRSS in a negative light, discrediting mobilisation processes, and further driving a wedge between the military and civilians. This is fuelled both by old narratives about ‘unfair forced mobilisation’ and “impunity during conscription”, as well as new content, particularly AI-generated material (provocative videos, stoking public tension on social media, and disinformation about the futility of resistance and ‘Ukraine’s inevitable defeat’). One of the most high-profile AI-generated “staged videos” was the so-called “footage from Khreshchatyk”, where, behind a female journalist from a Russian media outlet, men called for protests against the activities of the TCRSS, calling for them to be “disbanded and wiped out”.
Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres are portrayed as “man-hunters”, a “totalitarian, corrupt system” and “criminals”. Consequently, their activities “can and must be resisted”, including through violence. Analysts at the USCC have documented numerous videos in which civilians attempt to “rescue” men “from the clutches” of the TCRSS, engaging in open confrontation with military personnel: attacking them or their movable or immovable property. A persistent view prevails in public discourse that TCRSS representatives “should be on the front line, not carrying out mobilisation measures”. This attitude further legitimises aggression against them.
Mobilisation is portrayed as an “illegal process”, “the exploitation of people”, and is even equated with “unlawful deprivation of liberty”. Meanwhile, politicians and the senior military command are supposedly the ones benefiting from the war. Participation in the war, they say, is “futile and deadly, because all those mobilised will die”. The enemy extrapolates corruption schemes and high-profile scandals in the military sphere to the entire system without exception. In this way, the enemy attempts to create an artificial confrontation between “the military on the front line” and “the military of the TCRSS”. Dehumanising language is often used against the latter, typically reserved for the aggressor’s soldiers – “occupiers”, “Buryats”, etc. (i.e. projecting the image of the enemy onto the state itself). This undermines the unity of the Ukrainian Defence Forces and exacerbates internal polarisation.
So-called “forceful mobilisation” (busification) is the third of the key negative trends in the information space during the reporting period. These are often emotional, sensationalist, manipulative videos, devoid of legal arguments, which cement in people’s minds the violent nature of mobilisation in Ukraine, blurring the legal and factual landscape. Crisis situations remain a priority target for hostile information and propaganda services in order to provoke social division and convince Ukrainians of their unpreparedness for prolonged resistance. Against this backdrop, the impression is created that Ukraine is ready to make “significant concessions” in negotiations. And since Russia has not achieved significant successes on the battlefield, it is attempting to undermine Ukraine’s defence capabilities from within.
The few existing counter-narratives reveal the inner workings of the TCRSS and the human side of the military personnel serving there (reports by NV and DW). In reality, many of them are not rear-line personnel looking for “someone to send to fight in their place”, but have real combat experience and understand the needs of the front line. Such messages demonstrate a gradual shift towards more proactive, informed and inclusive communication on the part of the state. On the other hand, the communication system regarding corruption-related crimes and crisis situations in the mobilisation process needs improvement; during the reporting period, the system was working extremely cautiously (though, to its credit, it is increasingly being addressed at the highest levels of government – from the Office of the President to the Ministry of Defence). All these messages require repetition and dissemination across various platforms with maximum engagement of the target audience.
Crisis situations remain a priority target for the enemy. They are amplified through the targeted intervention of bot farms. Such cases quickly gain traction and shape the narrative, in which Ukraine is portrayed as a state of forced mobilisation, unprepared for defence, and Ukrainian society as unprepared for sustained resistance.
Unity
303,000 mentions from 131,000 authors – posts, comments, shares and reposts – revealed a negative sentiment in posts on the topic of unity, with a score of -92 against an absolute minimum of -100. Facebook dominates with 79% coverage, followed by Telegram (11%).
The enemy is actively exploiting criticism of the President and the Ukrainian authorities in general, attempting to polarise society by provoking and creating artificial divisions between supporters of different political forces. The political elite is “deliberately destroying the state” and everyone in power is a “traitor”, meaning there is no one left to fight for. Zelenskyy is also “to blame” for dragging out the war, whilst ordinary people are dying and freezing during the energy crisis caused by Russian strikes on infrastructure. The authorities are supposedly in chaos, with constant changes of personnel yielding no results, whilst in society, old conflicts are flaring up against a backdrop of war fatigue.
Although most of these posts were unsubstantiated, they are artificially spread across social media, particularly Facebook, using bot farms and group posts. This creates the impression of widespread public support for hostile narratives. TikTok, thanks to its unpredictable recommendations, can show demoralising videos or fake news with clickbait and emotional content to thousands of people – a direct influence on public consciousness. Anti-Ukrainian content is also present on YouTube in the form of short Reels videos or longer analytical ‘breakdowns’ with an equally anti-Ukrainian message and millions of views.
Given the constant attacks and natural war fatigue, society is becoming increasingly vulnerable to the influence of hostile propaganda. However, the presence of neutral-positive counter-narratives has generally softened the negative tone, preventing the information landscape from descending into total despair and a sense of betrayal. The media must be more careful in presenting information so as not to act as amplifiers of the aggressor’s propaganda.
AI-generated videos featuring alleged soldiers in the Verkhovna Rada, who were supposedly “left without equipment and ammunition due to corruption”, gained significant traction. Pro-Russian politicians, such as Yevhen Murayev, also became more active on relevant media platforms.
In this context, counter-narratives were also noticeable, supporting President Zelenskyy, personnel changes in the government, and the need to counter Russian information and psychological operations (in particular, the constant refutation of fake news about the sale of electricity abroad).
Generally speaking, we need to strengthen cooperation with international partners and conduct our own information and cyber operations in response to hostile actions, involving leading specialists. Educational campaigns aimed at the general public, designed to teach people how to distinguish between AI-generated fakes and deepfakes and real videos, would also be beneficial.
