The full article is published on The Moscow times
In August 2024, Ukraine initiated a military offensive in the Kursk Oblast. As of mid-October, Ukraine controls a larger portion of Russian territory than Russia managed to capture in Donetsk Oblast during their summer offensive campaign. Preliminary results of the operation indicate that Russia is now being forced to adjust its plans, particularly regarding further offensive operations. This includes the redeployment of certain units from other sectors of the front and the use of reserves. Overall, the Ukrainian operation in Kursk has achieved several significant objectives.
First and foremost, it has served as an asymmetrical response to the war of attrition that Russia has been attempting to impose on its own terms, aiming to exhaust Ukraine’s forces and resources. Given Russia’s superiority in artillery, ammunition, aviation, armored vehicles, and manpower, and consequently its ability to exert pressure along the entire front line, Ukraine has no choice but to wage a non-linear war against a superior enemy. Therefore, the operation in Kursk Oblast is an attempt by the Ukrainian command to break the game imposed by Russia, to turn the tables, and to attack those territories and positions where the enemy does not expect it. Moreover, this asymmetry has manifested not only in strategy and tactics but also on the battlefield itself.
The operation in the Kursk region is reminiscent of the Kharkiv operation in 2022, which was led by the current Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, in its maneuverability and surprise for the enemy. Kyiv continues to communicate Ukraine’s goals in the Kursk region rather cautiously. Nevertheless, we can already say that the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Russian Federation has at least justified itself in operational and tactical terms.
In particular, it has eliminated the threat to Sumy, Kharkiv and Chernihiv posed by the military group that was located in the Suzhansky district. This is one of the key objectives of the Ukrainian offensive, which actually effectively prevented the Russian “Sumy operation.” Also, with the appearance of Ukrainian troops in Kursk, the Russian logistics along the entire northern border were disrupted: rapid movement along the front line by rocky roads became impossible, as the railroad and main highways are under the control of Ukrainian forces. This means that future stockpiling in the Suzha area is now impossible, and other logistics along the border have also been impaired.
The suddenness of the Ukrainian operation made it possible to achieve another goal that is sensitive to the Russian authorities – the issue of prisoners of war.
Photo: REUTERS
Author: Dmytro Zhmailo, Military Expert and Executive Director USCC