In autumn 2024, the Kremlin made another step towards fresh nuclear blackmail. On 25 September, Vladimir Putin publicly hinted at the possibility of expanding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, stressing the need to “forecast the development of the situation” and update strategic documents to new circumstances. And on 19 November 2024, Putin signed an updated nuclear doctrine, setting out new rules of the nuclear game that were supposed to be a factor of pressure not only on Ukraine but also on the West, in particular, regarding further military support for Kyiv.
The updated doctrine stipulates a condition for Russia’s nuclear response in the event of a ‘critical threat’ to sovereignty, even in the event of the use of conventional weapons. Thus, one of the paragraphs states: “in the event of verified information about a large-scale launch of aerospace attack assets (including strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic, and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the Russian border.” In order to “lock in the effect” of the document, the Russian authorities demonstratively fired an experimental ballistic missile from the Kedr system at the million-plus Ukrainian city of Dnipro.
Almost seven months since Moscow updated its nuclear doctrine, Kyiv has carried out an unprecedented strike. On 1 June 2025, Ukraine conducted the historic Operation “Pavutyna (Spider’s Web)“, an attack on four Russian military airfields in the deep rear: “Belaya” (Irkutsk region), “Dyagilevo” (Ryazan region), “Olenya” (Murmansk region) and “Ivanovo” (Ivanovo region). According to initial information, the strikes destroyed or damaged more than 41 Russian strategic aircraft, including Tu-95, Tu-22M3, Tu-160 bombers and A-50 reconnaissance planes.
A hundred Ukrainian drones took off from specially equipped trucks right next to Russian air bases without crossing the border, raising questions not only about the security of strategic facilities in the deep rear, but also about the effectiveness of all Russian law enforcement agencies. In fact, Russia has not experienced such a shameful defeat since it was founded.
The damaging and destruction of Russian strategic bombers is not only a direct reduction in the military’s potential to launch missile strikes on civilian Ukrainian cities. In strategic terms, Operation “Spider’s Web” caused significant damage to the part of the Russian nuclear arsenal that Moscow will find extremely difficult to restore. In particular, restoration will require decades and billions of dollars – and this is only if the Russian defence industry is capable of producing such aircraft at all.
Russia has no established serial production of new strategic bombers and is currently upgrading and assembling the vehicles using aircraft bodies that have been saved since the 1980s. This process is called ‘reproduction’ in Russia, but it is not a full-fledged production from scratch. For example, no new aircraft have been produced in recent years, and only a few modernised Tu-160Ms have been assembled using Soviet bodies.
Moreover, such successes by Ukraine’s Defense Forces may have another consequence: they serve as a clear demonstration of Kyiv’s capabilities — a trump card that Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed Ukraine lacked when speaking about the war.
The full article is published on Euromaidan Press
Photo: Maxar Technologies/Handout via REUTERS
Author: Anton Zemlianyi